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In this study, we test formally the market value of investor relations (IR) activity employing 
the annual Investor Relations Magazine Best Overall IR Awards data from 2000 to 2002 to 
proxy for the quality of firm investor relations. We find firms perceived by survey 
respondents to have effective IR strategies have significantly higher market value, and, also, 
earn superior abnormal returns, both before and after the award nominations.  We also find 
that, not surprisingly, higher analyst following is associated with more nominations, 
suggesting analysts tend to favor the stocks they follow, although being nominated for best 
overall IR is also consistent with a significant increase in analyst following in the following 
year.  Finally, in line with effective IR leading to lower information risk, liquidity of 
nominated firms, measured by stock turnover, increases in the year subsequent to the award 
nominations. Overall, our evidence is consistent with good IR successfully reducing the risk 
to investors associated with high information asymmetry, as predicted by information risk 
and agency theories. 
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1. Introduction 
Well-functioning capital markets require a free flow of relevant information to 
enable efficient asset pricing. The investor relations (IR) industry has developed 
substantially over the past few decades, primarily driven by a growing demand 
for firms to provide a higher degree of information transparency and 
accountability to multiple stakeholders.  The National Investor Relations 
Institute (NIRI) defines IR as "A corporate marketing activity, combining the 
disciplines of communications and finance, providing current and potential 
investors with an accurate portrayal of a firm's performance and prospects, 
therefore having a positive effect on total value relative to the overall market 
and the firm's cost of capital."  However, despite the substantial increase in 
importance firms now place on IR activities, little attention to date has been paid 
in the literature as to whether an effective IR strategy adds to shareholder value.  
This study seeks to test directly whether high investor relations (IR) quality 
ratings are associated with higher firm market value – i.e., is investor relations 
market relevant?   Specifically, we address this issue by comparing the market 
value, stock returns, liquidity, analyst coverage, and liquidity of firms nominated 
by security analysts and fund managers for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the annual 
Investor Relations Magazine IR Awards for 2000 to 2002, which proxies for 
market perceptions of effective investor relations, with firms not so rated. 
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We find that firms nominated for the Best Overall IR category in the annual 
Investor Relations Magazine IR survey are valued by the market significantly higher 
than unrated firms using the Ohlson (1995) model approach, and the best rated firms 
more than the other rated firms.  In addition, over the year following the IR awards, 
nominated firms earn a highly significant superior abnormal return of 0.8% per month, 
controlling for prior returns and other characteristics, suggesting the market does not 
fully impound the implications of better IR.  Examining the relation between analyst 
following and investor relations quality, our results show that, not surprisingly, the more 
analysts reporting on the firm, the more nominations for best overall IR award the firm 
receives in the following year.  However, more importantly, best overall IR ratings are 
directly associated with a significant increase in subsequent analyst coverage compared 
with firms with no votes.  Finally, we find that stock liquidity, as measured by relative 
stock turnover, increases by no less than 14% for the best IR rated firms, and 7% for the 
other rated firms, compared with firms unrated by survey respondents.  In summary, 
consistent with the predictions of information risk and agency theories, which together 
propose that enhanced corporate communications will reduce information risk or agency 
problems caused by high information asymmetry, we find that firms nominated for best 
overall IR in the Investor Relations Magazine annual survey experience higher market 
value, increase in stock returns, growth in analyst coverage, and greater liquidity. 
Brennan and Tamaronski (2000) demonstrate a chain of relationships that together 
establish a putative “direct link between a firm’s investor relations policy and its stock 
price”.  The first link in this chain is an increase in analyst following that can result 
from a good corporate IR strategy that operates primarily by reducing analysts’ research 
costs (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick 1997; 
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Holland, 1998).  Secondly, there is empirical support that higher analyst coverage has a 
significant positive impact on liquidity, both directly due to reduced trading costs, and 
also indirectly through the consequent effect on equity trading volumes (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyan, 1996).  Finally, Amihud et al. (1997) find that increased stock liquidity 
directly impacts stock prices, thus completing the final link in a putative chain of 
causation from effective IR to shareholder value. 
However, there is limited empirical evidence on a direct link between a firm’s 
investor relations activity and market pricing.  Botosan (1997) constructs a subjective 
disclosure quality index based on annual report disclosures, which are treated implicitly 
as a proxy for the effectiveness of the firm’s overall market communication policy.  
Based on a small sample of firms in a single industry in 1991, she finds a direct 
negative relation between her firm disclosure index score and cost of equity, but only 
for firms with low analyst coverage.  However, the role of IR is much more than just 
conveying formal financial information to the market (Marcus and Wallace, 1997), 
hence Botosan’s findings can only indirectly relate to the question of value relevance of 
good investor relations.  
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) employ the AIMR survey of corporate 
communications ratings, based on a survey of analysts and fund managers, to test the 
stock performance of the 97 firms with three years of consecutive increases in their 
disclosure quality ratings to 1996.  They find that, on average, these firms’ stocks 
earned excess risk-adjusted returns of approximately 5% over this period.   Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002) use the same AIMR disclosure ratings for the period 1986-1996 but find 
no significant relation between firms’ IR ratings and their cost of equity capital.  
However, both Healy et al. (1999), and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) employ the 
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composite AIMR ratings which do not provide a ‘pure’ measure of the value of a firm’s 
IR activities, since survey respondent perceptions of the quality of firm IR only 
accounts for 30% of the overall AIMR rating.  As such, these two papers are best 
viewed as exploring the general relation between a firm’s market communications 
activity, and its market value. 
Finally, of most direct relevance to this paper, Bushee and Miller (2007) consider 
210 small and mid-cap firms that initiate IR programs between 1999 and 2004 by hiring 
professional IR agencies.  They find that these companies significantly increase their 
level of disclosure, media coverage, and analyst following, as well as institutional 
ownership.  In addition, the authors find significant associated abnormal returns, and 
fall in the book-to-market ratio.  They argue that IR activities play an important role in 
helping small and mid-cap companies to overcome their low visibility, because they do 
not generally trade on a major exchange, to attract a wider following by investors and 
information intermediaries, and to improve their market valuation.   Our study differs to 
that of Bushee and Miller (2007) in a number of ways.  First, our rated firms, averaging 
1,040 each year, are all listed on the main exchanges, and tend to be much larger and 
better established than Bushee and Miller’s more specialized sample, 60% of which are 
listed on the OTC Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets, and the remaining 40% on NASDAQ. 
Also our firms are likely to have more established IR programs and be already well 
followed by analysts, being nominated for IR industry awards.  Finally, we address 
different, but somewhat related, research questions. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents our hypotheses, 
data and method, section 3 presents our results, and section 4 summarises our findings. 
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2. Hypotheses, Data and Method 
2.1. Hypotheses 
The IR function of a firm is a dedicated channel of information from senior 
management to external stakeholders, hence IR performance, in theory should have 
significant impact on information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Effective 
IR should reduce the risk premium associated with information asymmetry leading, 
ceteris paribus, to higher market value.  It should also lower the cost of analyst 
information gathering for, and raise the firm’s profile with, investors thereby creating 
higher demand for analyst coverage of firms with better IR. Higher analyst coverage, 
combined with lower information asymmetry, should increase liquidity leading to lower 
liquidity premium and therefore higher stock returns. Information risk theory and 
agency theory thus together provide a framework in which an effective IR policy can 
influence both market value and stock liquidity by reducing the risk associated with 
high information asymmetry.  
In an efficient market, the implications of effective IR activity, as proxied by the 
Investor Relations Magazine best overall IR firm ratings, will already be impounded in 
stock prices, and not associated with subsequent abnormal returns.  If effective IR is 
value relevant, its impact will already be manifested in firm market value. We thus test 
null hypothesis H10: 
H10: Effective IR has no impact on firm market value. 
 
While effective IR can reduce information asymmetry, if the market is efficient 
with respect to impounding the implications of effective IR, firms that are nominated 
for the Investor Relations Magazine awards should not earn significant abnormal returns 
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over the year following the nomination. We thus establish our second null hypothesis: 
H20:   There is no significant relation between effective IR and future excess equity 
returns. 
 
Effective IR should also lead to an increase in analyst coverage, because a main 
goal of good IR is to reduce analyst information search time and costs, leading to 
increased demand for analysts’ services. We therefore establish our third null hypothesis: 
H30: There is no significant relation between effective IR and  increase in analyst 
coverage. 
 
Information risk and agency theories together predict that effective IR will reduce 
the perceived risks that investors associate with high information asymmetry with 
management, and thus reduced information asymmetry will lead to increased stock 
liquidity. Our fourth null hypothesis is thus: 




Since 1996 the Investor Relations Magazine has commissioned annually an independent 
research firm to obtain nominations from investors and analyst for firms that have 
performed the ‘best’ in distinct categories of IR over the previous 12 months. 
Nominations for the period 2000-2002 were collected from a large sample of fund 
managers and sell and buy-side analysts listed in the Thomson Financial I/B/E/S, 
Barron’s and WILink databases, covering a wide range of industry sectors and 
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investment specialisations, although all respondents were encouraged to nominate firms 
outside their specialities.  An average of 1,708 respondents responded to each annual 
survey.  The nomination-collection process took place during March, and was finalised 
on 31 March each year but nominations should only have related to IR performance 
over the previous 12 months. Table 1, panel A presents the number of firms nominated 
in each category for each of the three years in the sample. 
Table 1 here 
Stock returns, market values, and trading volumes are extracted from the Centre for 
Research in Share Prices (CRSP) database. Book value of equity and net income are 




Each year from 2000 to 2002, firms nominated for best overall IR in the respective 
Investor Relations Magazine survey in the ‘large firms’ category (market capitalization 
> $3bn) are sorted by the number of nominations received, and divided into two 
portfolios formed at the median breakpoints of award nominations.  The ‘Best rated’ 
portfolio consists of firms that receive more than the median number of nominations, 
and the ‘Other rated’ portfolio all the other firms that receive at least one nomination.  
Similarly, firms nominated in the ‘small firms’ category (market capitalization < $3bn) 
are also sorted into two portfolios on the same basis.  Finally, we form two pooled 
portfolios, the ‘Best rated’ pooled portfolio is formed by pooling together the ‘Best 
rated’ firms from both the large and small categories, and the ‘Other rated’ pooled 
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portfolio is formed in the same way.   Panel B of table 1 presents the number of firms in 
each portfolio, pooled across the three award years.1 
 
To assess the value relevance of effective investor relations, we employ the well 
established Ohlson (1995) valuation model to provide an appropriate framework to 
measure the incremental contribution to firm value of variables other than book value 
and current earnings (Quirin et al., 2000). The model explicitly recognises that some 
value relevant information will appear in accounting numbers with a time lag.  Thus, 
since investor relations reputation is built over time,2 we follow Easton (1999) and use 
price level rather than returns regression. Ohlson (1995) derives his valuation function 
(equation 7, p. 670) as: 
Pt = b1(Et – Dt) + b2 BVEt + b3 nt (1) 
 
where: 
Pt = market value of the firm’s equity at time t, 
Et = earnings of the firm for the period (t-1, t), 
Dt = net dividends paid at time t,  
BVEt = net book value at time t, and 
nt = information other than abnormal earnings. 
We make several modifications to the basic valuation equation: 
(i) To measure the market impact of effective IR, as proxied by nominations 
for the Investor Relations Magazine best overall IR awards, we assume the 
                                               
1 Since the portfolios are formed using percentiles of votes, the number of stocks in the portfolios is not 
equal. 
2  Though the respondents are asked to nominate firms based on their IR performance over the previous 
 12 months, they would have been building their IR departments and policies over time. 
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IR rating reflects information other than that contained in current earnings 
and book value. 
(ii) We set dividends to zero consistent with Barth et al. (1998), and Graham et 
al. (2003) among other studies. 
(iii) Barth and Kallapur (1996) suggest that the coefficient estimates of such 
price level equations could be biased due to scale differences in the cross-
section of firms.  As such, we use weighted least squares regression with 
market capitalizations as weights to remove scale bias, consistent with 
Easton and Sommers (2003). 
 
To test whether the firms nominated for IR awards earn superior risk-adjusted stock 
returns, we employ the conventional Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
            RP,t – RF,t = a + b RMRFt + s SMBt + h HMLt + m MOMt + et (2) 
 where 
RP,t = the average of the returns of the firms in portfolio P during month t, 
RF,t = the risk free rate (US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
RMRFt = excess return on the market factor in month t, 
SMBt    = return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt      = return on the mimicking portfolio for the book-to-market factor in month t, 
and 
MOMt   = return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t. 
RMRF, SMB, HML and MOM factors are from the Kenneth French web site.3 
 
                                               
3 (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/).   
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To test the average level of analyst coverage of firms over the year immediately 
prior to the nomination year, we pool our sample firms across award years and run the 
following multinomial logistic regression which controls for firm market value at each 
year-end, and prior-year stock returns: 
IRi,t = a + bAF AFi,t-1 + bMV ln(MVi,t) + bPYR PYRi,t-1 + ei (3) 
where 
 IRi,t = 0 if the firm is not rated, 1 if the number of nominations it receives is less than 
median (‘Other rated’), and 2 if the number of nominations it receives is greater than the 
median (‘Best rated’), 
AFi,t-1 = number of analysts publishing forecasts in the I/B/E/S FirstCall database for 
firm i in the year prior to the nominations,  
MVi,t = market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of nomination, and 
PYR i,t-1 = stock returns from March of year t-2 to February of year t-1 (where t is the 
year of nominations).  
 
 To test whether there is a change in analyst following in the year after the 
nomination, we run the following regression: 
AFi,t+1 - AFi,t-1 = a + bOR ORi,t + bBR BRi,t + bMV ln(MVi,t) + bPYR1 PYR1i  
+ bPYR2 PYR2i + bPYR3 PYR3i + ei (4) 
 
where  
AFi,t-1 = number of analysts publishing forecasts for firm i in the I/B/E/S FirstCall 
database in the year prior to the nominations,  
AFi,t+1 = number of analysts publishing forecasts for firm i in the I/B/E/S FirstCall 
database in the year subsequent to the nominations,  
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ORi,t = 1 if the number of nominations it receives is less than median (‘Other rated’), 0 
otherwise,  
BRi,t = 1 if the number of nominations it receives is greater than the median (‘Best 
rated’), 0 otherwise, 
MVi,t = market value of equity of firm i at March 31 in the year of nomination,  
PYR1i = stock returns from March 1 of year t-2 to February 28 of year t-1,  
PYR2i = stock returns from March 1 of year t-1 to February 28 of year t, and  
PYR3i = stock returns from March 1 of year t to February 28 of year t+1. 
 
To test whether stock liquidity increases after the IR award nominations, we use the 
stock turnover ratio as a measure of liquidity.  The monthly turnover ratio for each stock 





TO =  (5) 
where 
TOit  = turnover ratio of stock i during month t, 
Volit  = total trading volumes of stock i during month t, and 
SOit  = number of shares outstanding for firm i at the end of  month t. 









RTO  (6) 
where  
t+t,t,iOT  = average monthly turnover ratio for firm i over the period t to t+t, 
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 t+t,t,mOT = average monthly turnover ratio for all firms in the same size category over 
the period t to t+t, 
The change in relative turnover (DRTO) is calculated as follows: 
DRTOi =  RTOi,t  - RTOi,t-1  (7) 
where 
RTOi,t = average monthly relative turnover for firm i from April of year of nomination 
to March of the year after the nomination, and  
RTOi,t-1 = average monthly relative turnover for firm i from March of year before 
nomination to February of year of nomination. 
 
Finally, to test for the relation between change in stock liquidity and the IR rating, 
controlling for firm size, we estimate the following regression: 
DRTOi = a + bOR ORi  + bBR BRi  + bMV ln(MVi) + ei (8) 
where  
MVi = market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of nomination, and 
ORi,t = 1 if the number of nominations it receives is less than median (‘Other rated’), 0 
otherwise,  
BRi,t = 1 if the number of nominations it receives is greater than the median (‘Best 
rated’), 0 otherwise, 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Value relevance 
The results of our regressions using equation (1) to assess the value relevance of 
effective investor relations are presented in table 2. The results show a strong positive 
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relation between IR rating and market value for both small and large firms, clearly 
demonstrating that better investor relations is associated with higher market value.4 We 
therefore reject null hypothesis H10; effective investor relations does make an 
incremental contribution to firm value. 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2. Equity returns 
Table 3 shows that over the year immediately prior to the IR awards, firms nominated 
for the awards earn significant positive abnormal returns, and the superior performance 
is present across both large and small firms, as well as across both IR rated portfolios. 
However, large firms that were not nominated earned abnormal returns higher than 
those for the rated firms. The evidence shows prior superior financial performance may 
drive nominations for the IR awards, at least in the case of smaller firms.  
Table 3 here 
Table 3 panel C shows that the sample firms earn 80 basis points (bp) per month 
abnormal returns post nomination, which is significant at the 1% level (t = 3.40), and 
both, large firms (panel A) and small firms (panel B) outperform significantly (76bp 
and 85bp per month respectively). The evidence leads us to reject null hypothesis H20 
that the nominated firms do not earn superior returns post nomination. Although the 
average abnormal return over the 12-month period post award nomination is lower than 
that for the previous 12 months for all portfolios, nonetheless, the market does not 
                                               
4 For the median large firm with market capitalization of $7.8bn, moving from ‘unrated’ to ‘other rated’ is 
associated with increase in market value of about $3bn, and moving from unrated to ‘best rated’ an 
increase in market value of about $11bn. For the median small firm with market capitalization of $98.6m, 
the associated increases in market value are $1.6m and $6.0m respectively.  For the median firm in our 
overall sample with market capitalization of $141.6m, the respective increases in market value are $2.0m 
and $9.5m. 
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appear fully to incorporate the implications of better IR strategies, and can thus be 
viewed as inefficient with respect to this information. 
 
3.3. Analyst Coverage 
The average analyst following for firms nominated for best overall IR in the 
Investor Relations Magazine awards is higher than that for those not nominated in the 
year before nomination. For large firms, prior average analyst following is 16.8, while 
that for small firms it is 6.9.  In contrast, average following for large unrated firms in 
the prior award year is 11.5, and for small unrated firms it is only 2.2.5  
Regression results in table 4 show that, controlling for firm market value and prior 
year returns, there is a strong positive relation between prior analyst coverage and 
number of IR award nominations for both large and small firms. For large firms,  a unit 
increase in analyst following increases the probability of the firm being in ‘other rated’ 
by 2% (an odds ratio of 1.02x) and that of the firm being in ‘best rated’ by 4% (odds 
ratio of 1.04). For small firms, the respective probability increases are 4% and 6% (odds 
ratios 1.04 and 1.06).  The results show that the higher prior year analyst following, the 
greater the number of nominations received by a firm. Not surprisingly, the relation is 
stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms. Thus, table 4 provides evidence of a 
strong positive relation between prior analyst following and IR rating, consistent with 
that of Lang and Lundholm (1993) survey respondents tend to vote for firms they are 
familiar with. 
Table 4 here 
 
                                               
5 Full results are not tabulated for brevity and are available from the first author on request. 
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Table 5 shows that controlling for size and prior year returns, there is a strong 
positive relation between IR ranking and change in analyst following. The results show 
that for large firms, ‘other rated’ firms experience an increase of 1.64 analysts, and ‘best 
rated’ an increase of 2.53 analysts following them relative to ‘unrated’ firms. For small 
firms, the increase in number of analysts following them is 0.72 and 1.21 for ‘other 
rated’ and ‘best rated’ firms respectively. The results lead us to reject null hypothesis 
H30 at conventional levels.  The evidence is consistent with effective IR leading to 
increased analyst following, in line with the prediction of lower information costs. 
Table 5 here 
 
3.4. Stock liquidity 
Table 6 clearly shows that controlling for size, there is a strong positive association 
between the number of nominations received, and change in relative turnover ratio for 
small firms, with relative turnover ratio increasing by 18% for ‘other rated’ and by 37% 
for ‘best rated’ firms compared with firms with no votes.  However, surprisingly, we 
find a negative relation for large firms, although for the firm sample as a whole the 
equivalent relative stock turnover ratio increases are 14% and 7%.  This provides 
evidence against null hypothesis H40, relative trading volumes increase for nominated 
firms, and the increase is higher for firms that receive more nominations. The results are 
consistent with increased liquidity for small nominated firms as costs associated with 
information asymmetry fall for small firms with better communications strategies as 
proxied by their IR award nominations. 
 
Table 6 here 
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4. Conclusions and summary 
This study uses firms nominated for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the Investor Relations 
Magazine surveys of large numbers of fund managers and buy- and sell-side analysts 
over the period 2000 to 2002.  We first find that nominated firms are rewarded with 
significantly higher market valuations than those that are unrated, and those with above 
median ratings more than those below the median, demonstrating the importance of 
effective investor relations programs.  
We also show that nominated firms have higher abnormal stock returns over the 
year immediately preceding the award nomination period, suggesting past performance 
drives firm nominations to some extent.  However, more importantly, this 
outperformance continues over the subsequent year, though on an attenuated basis, 
suggesting that the market is unable to price this quality of IR activity information 
efficiently.  
Consistent with behavioural finance theories that suggest effective IR might 
enhance the ‘availability’ of a stock, thus leading decision makers, such as security 
analysts, to favor a firm, we find firms that receive IR award nominations tend to have 
higher analyst following in the year before nomination.  However, controlling for this, 
we also show that effective IR actually serves to increase analyst coverage by likely 
reducing the time and costs of analysing information for analysts leading to increased 
demand for analysts’ services from investors.  
Finally, in line with information risk and agency theories that predict reduced 
perceived risk due to effective IR leading to lower transaction and ‘agency costs’ for 
stockholders, we find a significant increase in trading volumes and thus liquidity, in the 
case of our small nominated firms. 
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In summary, we find firms nominated for the Investor Relations Magazine Best 
Overall IR award, which proxies for effective IR strategies, have higher market values, 
higher stock returns, increased analyst following and higher liquidity.  We thus 
conclude that, consistent with information and agency cost theories, good IR has clear 
market impact. We believe this is the first study in the literature to have demonstrated 
this for a large cross-section of main exchange listed firms. 
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Table 1: Number of sample firms 
Panel A shows the number of firms in the sample each year with market capitalization > $3 
billion at the end of December of the year prior to the nomination, panel B shows the number of 
firms in the sample each year with market capitalization < $3 billion at the end of December of 
the year prior to the nomination, and panel C shows the total number of firms in the sample each 
year. ‘Best rated’ refers to the firms with number of votes > median number of votes, ‘Other 
rated’ refers to all other nominated firms, and ‘Unrated’ refers to all firms that were not 




 2000 2001 2002 Total 
A. Large firms 
All rated 487 457 416 1,360 
Best rated 219 213 169 601 
Other rated 268 244 247 759 
All Unrated 145 120 126 391 
B. Small firms 
All rated 686 531 548 1,765 
Best rated 210 187 197 594 
Other rated 476 344 351 1,171 
All Unrated 5,639 5,488 4,854 15,981 
C. All firms 
All rated 1,173 988 964 3,125 
Best rated 429 400 366 1,195 
Other rated 744 588 598 1,930 
All Unrated 5,784 5,608 4,980 16,372 
 




Table 2: Value relevance 
All companies nominated for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the Investor Relations Magazine 2000, 
2001 and 2002 annual IR surveys, and all stocks that receive no votes are included in 
our sample. ‘Large’ refers to stocks with market capitalization of more than $3 billion 
as at 31st of December of the year prior to the nominations and ‘Small’ refers to all other 
stocks. ‘All’ refers to all stocks pooled across ‘Large’ and ‘Small’.  
The following regression is estimated: 
MVi,t = a + bBVE BVEi,t + bNI NIi,t + bOR ORi,t + bBR BRi,t + ei  
where MVi is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of 
nomination (t), BVEi is the book value of common equity for firm i and NIi is the net 
income before extraordinary items for firm i. The accounting data is lagged by 6 months. 
ORi,t is 1 if the number of nominations received by firm i is less than the median (‘Other 
rated’), 0 otherwise, and BRi,t is 1 if the number of nominations received by firm i is 
greater than the median (‘Best rated’), 0 otherwise. The median is computed each year 
for ‘Small’ and ‘Large’ firms separately. 
 
 a bBVE bNI bOR bBR Adj R2 
1.04 1.75 0.85 1.10 3.97 Large 
(2.57) (24.90) (6.07) (2.38) (7.41) 
0.32 
       
0.01 0.48 0.10 0.16 0.60 Small 
(15.25) (61.67) (5.94) (21.81) (31.61) 
0.30 
       
-0.01 1.16 0.46 0.17 0.84 All 
(3.32) (76.94) (13.85) (9.65) (18.49) 
0.32 
 




Table 3: Risk adjusted returns 
Portfolios in panel A are formed as follows: each year from 2000 to 2002, all companies 
nominated for ‘Best Overall IR by a large firm’ by the Investor Relations Magazine are 
sorted into 2 portfolios: ‘Best rated’ has the firms with number of votes > median 
number of votes and ‘Other rated’ has all other rated firms.  All other firms that are not 
rated are in the ‘Unrated’ portfolio.  
Portfolios in panel B are formed as in panel A but using all companies nominated 
for ‘Best IR by a small firm’ by the Investor Relations Magazine.  
‘Best Rated’ in panel C is formed by pooling ‘Best rated’ firms from panels A and 
B. Similarly, ‘All rated’, ‘Other rated’, and ‘Unrated’ are formed by pooling firms from 
the respective portfolios in panels A and B similarly.  
The following regression is carried out for each portfolio: 
RPt – RFt = a + b (RMRFt) + s SMBt + h HMLt + w WMLt + et.  
Where RPt is the equally-weighted return on portfolio P in month t, RFt is the 1-
month Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of month t, RMRFt is the return on the market 
factor in month t, SMBt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in 
month t, HMLt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t 
and WML the return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t. 
Previous 12-months refer to monthly returns from March of year t-1 to February of the 
award year t, and next 12-months refer to monthly returns from April of award year t to 
March of the year t+1. Stocks that are delisted during the holding period are assumed to 
earn portfolio returns for the rest of the period.  
 
 Previous 12 months Next 12 months 
 Intercept t Adj R2 Intercept t Adj R2 
A. Large firms 
All rated 1.71 6.49 0.94 0.76 2.95 0.96 
Best rated 1.66 5.55 0.93 0.70 2.22 0.94 
Other rated 1.75 5.51 0.92 0.82 2.98 0.96 
All Unrated 3.50 4.48 0.61 0.43 0.88 0.90 
B. Small firms 
All rated 1.62 4.17 0.92 0.85 3.08 0.96 
Best rated 1.73 4.27 0.89 0.59 1.70 0.94 
Other rated 1.56 3.65 0.91 0.99 3.43 0.96 
All Unrated 0.80 1.31 0.82 0.63 1.11 0.85 
C. All firms 
All rated 1.65 6.29 0.95 0.80 3.40 0.97 
Best rated 1.72 5.69 0.93 0.62 2.42 0.96 
Other rated 1.60 5.88 0.95 0.92 3.75 0.97 
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Table 4: Analyst coverage regression estimation 
All companies nominated for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the Investor Relations Magazine 2000, 
2001 and 2002 annual IR surveys, and all stocks that receive no votes are included in 
our sample. ‘Large’ refers to stocks with market capitalization of more than $3 billion 
as at 31st of December of the year prior to the nominations and ‘Small’ refers to all other 
stocks. ‘All’ refers to all stocks pooled across ‘Large’ and ‘Small’.  
The following regression is estimated: 
IRi,t = a + bAF AFi,t-1 + bMV ln(MVi,t) + bPYR PYRi,t-1 + ei  
where AFi,t-1 is the number of analysts publishing forecasts in the I/B/E/S FirstCall 
database for firm i in the year prior to the nominations, MVi,t is the market value of 
equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of nomination, and PYR i,t refers to the stock 
returns from March of year t-2 to February of year t-1 (where t is the year of 
nominations). IRi,t is 0 if the firm is not rated, 1 if the number of nominations it receives 
is less than median (‘Other rated’), and 2 if the number of nominations it receives is 
greater than the median (‘Best rated’). The median is computed each year for ‘Small’ 
and ‘Large’ firms separately. 
 
 
 Other rated Best rated 
 a bAF bMV bPYR a bAF bMV bPYR 
-5.60 0.02 0.41 0.38 -24.44 0.04 0.44 1.50 Large 
(3.24) (2.24) (3.85) (3.35) (13.31) (3.76) (3.99) (12.73) 
         
-13.72 0.04 0.10 0.88 -23.40 0.08 0.19 1.51 Small 
(34.00) (5.95) (2.92) (27.51) (27.14) (9.30) (4.43) (23.75) 
         
-13.76 0.04 0.13 0.89 -19.49 0.06 0.20 1.22 All 
(43.41) (6.55) (4.51) (35.68) (42.01) (8.58) (5.61) (35.58) 




Table 5: Change in analyst following 
All companies nominated for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the Investor Relations Magazine 2000, 
2001 and 2002 annual IR surveys, and all stocks that receive no votes are included in 
our sample. ‘Large’ refers to stocks with market capitalization of more than $3 billion 
as at 31st of December of the year prior to the nominations and ‘Small’ refers to all other 
stocks. ‘All’ refers to all stocks pooled across ‘Large’ and ‘Small’.  
The following regression is estimated: 
AFi,t+1 - AFi,t-1 = a + bOR ORi,t + bBR BRi,t + bMV ln(MVi,t) + bPYR1 PYR1i  
+ bPYR2 PYR2i + bPYR3 PYR3i + ei  
where AFi,t-1 and AFi,t+1 are the number of analysts publishing forecasts in I/B/E/S 
FirstCall database for firm i in the year prior to and subsequent to the nominations year 
respectively, MVi,t is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of 
nomination, PYR1 refers to the stock returns from March of year t-2 to February of year 
t-1, PYR2 refers to the stock returns from March of year t-1 to February of year t and 
PYR 3 refers to the returns from March of year t to February of year t+1 (where t is the 
year of nominations). ORi,t is 1 if the number of nominations received by firm i is less 
than the median (‘Other rated’), 0 otherwise, and BRi,t is 1 if the number of nominations 
received  by firm i is greater than the median (‘Best rated’), 0 otherwise. The median is 
computed each year for ‘Small’ and ‘Large’ firms separately. 
 
 a bOR bBR bMV bPYR1 bPYR2 bPYR3 Adj R2 
15.02 1.64 2.53 -1.16 1.10 1.40 -2.06 Large 
(4.71) (3.49) (4.67) (5.73) (6.72) (8.82) (4.60) 
0.11 
         
1.40 0.72 1.21 -0.19 0.58 0.73 0.25 Small 
(9.18) (8.11) (9.99) (14.29) (22.52) (32.49) (8.84) 
0.09 
         
2.35 0.81 1.14 -0.28 0.70 0.84 0.20 All 
(13.94) (8.69) (9.61) (18.99) (23.59) (32.12) (5.70) 
0.08 




Table 6: Relative turnover regression analysis 
All companies nominated for ‘Best Overall IR’ in the Investor Relations Magazine 2000, 
2001 and 2002 annual IR surveys, and all stocks that receive no votes are included in 
our sample. ‘Large’ refers to stocks with market capitalization of more than $3 billion 
as at 31st of December of the year prior to the nominations and ‘Small’ refers to all other 
stocks. ‘All’ refers to all stocks pooled across ‘Large’ and ‘Small’.  
pooled across ‘Large’ and ‘Small’.  
The following regression is estimated: 
DRTOi = a + bOR ORi + bBR BRi + bMV ln(MVi) + ei  
where DRTO is the difference between the relative turnover ratio (RTO) for the 
year after the award nomination and the RTO for the year before the award nomination. 
Relative turnover for the year is computed as the ratio of average monthly turnover ratio 
for stock i and average monthly turnover ratio for the market over the same period. 
DRTO is the difference between RTO in the following year and RTO during the 
previous year. MVi is the market value of equity of firm i at 31 March in the year of 
nomination (t). ORi is 1 if the number of nominations received by firm i is less than  the 
median (‘Other rated’), 0 otherwise, and BRi is 1 if the number of nominations received 
by firm i is greater than the median (‘Best rated’), 0 otherwise. The median is computed 
each year for ‘Small’ and ‘Large’ firms separately. 
 
 
 a bOR bBR bMV F 
-0.26 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 Large 
(0.85) (2.68) (1.95) (1.10) 
2.63** 
      
-0.68 0.18 0.37 0.06 Small 
(9.69) (4.35) (6.52) (9.31) 
75.50*** 
      
-0.43 0.07 0.14 0.03 All 
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